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Abstract 
Conventional normative economics is built on the assumption that people act as if seeking to 
satisfy coherent and a priori preferences. This model has however been challenged by many 
empirical works highlighting the existence of systematic deviations from the behaviour 
predicted by the neoclassical theory. The development of behavioural economics therefore 
questions the validity of the results developed by normative economists. Reconciling 
behavioural and normative economics needs in particular a clarification of the normative 
content of economic prescriptions, since it appears that the assumption of rational preferences 
enabled economists to overstep this question, the different interpretations of the current 
normative criterion of preference-satisfaction leading in fine to the same prescriptions. In this 
paper, we want to highlight that libertarian paternalism is probably the most natural solution 
to the reconciliation problem for neoclassical economists, since its current formulation relies 
on the existence of a rational homo œconomicus trapped within each individual. We can 
however find within the current formulation of libertarian paternalism the same difficulties 
than the ones of Pareto's theory of the homo œconomicus. We therefore suggest a 
reformulation of libertarian paternalism based on a normative criterion of individual 
autonomy rather than preference-satisfaction, and defend its relevance in the specific context 
of common-pool resources, by showing that the normative prescriptions generated by our 
principle of individual autonomy present strong similarities with the institutional design 
principles of Ostrom (1990) enabling a sustainable management of common-pool resources. 
 
Keywords: welfare economics, libertarian paternalism, homo œconomicus, nudge, autonomy, 
common-pool resources. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The recent development of behavioural economics produced a large literature showing 
the existence of numerous and systematic inconsistencies in individual preferences (see 
for instance Kahneman and Tversky 2000 and Camerer 2003). Those evidence raise 
serious issues for welfare economics, since its main results are build on the assumptions 
that the individuals are rational and act as if seeking to satisfy coherent preferences. 
Furthermore, this also questions standard methods of welfare analysis such as cost-
benefit analysis, which assumes the stability of individual preferences and the possibility 
of assessing individual welfare through the satisfaction of individual preferences. The 
difficulty of reconciling behavioural and normative economics is that the normative 
criterion used by welfare economists is the satisfaction of individual preferences: 
McQuillin and Sugden (2012) argue that this criterion can be interpreted in three 
conceptually different ways – as an evaluation in terms of happiness, self-assessed well-
being or freedom – which lead to the same prescriptions as long as the preferences of the 
individuals are coherent. However, since it empirically appears that the preferences of the 
individuals are generally incoherent, the different interpretations of the preference-
satisfaction criterion do not lead to the same prescriptions any more: economists must 
therefore choose one of these interpretations in order to clarify the normative content of 
their prescriptions. In the first case, economists evaluate the soundness of a policy 
according to the welfare it generates, objectively defined in a mental-state perspective. 
According to this approach, some mental states are intrinsically good, such as pleasure or 
happiness – in the spirit of Bentham's hedonism (Kahneman et al. 1997). In the second 
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case, the evaluation is in terms of a subjective notion of welfare, defined as what the 
individual values as preferable to herself if she had “complete information, unlimited 
cognitive abilities, and no lack of self-control” (Sunstein and Thaler 2003, 1162). This 
approach was introduced by Sunstein and Thaler (2003) and Camerer et al. (2003), and 
popularized by Thaler and Sunstein (2008) thanks to their book Nudge: Improving 
Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness. The proponents of this criterion defend 
a “soft paternalism” – “libertarian paternalism” for Sunstein and Thaler and “asymmetric 
paternalism” for Camerer et al. – and justify paternalistic interventions if they correct the 
possible decision flaws of the individuals without coercing their choices. In the third 
case, the evaluation does not focus any more on the effective choices of the individuals, 
but on the opportunity they had making choices among a wide range of alternatives. This 
argument has been developed by Sugden (2004, 2007), who suggests using a normative 
criterion of opportunity rather than preference-satisfaction. 
The second interpretation in terms of self-assessed well-being derives from the standard 
model of the individual used in normative economics: the individual is indeed conceived 
as a rational entity “trapped” in a non rational one, the latter offering a biased perception 
of the world to the former, who is then unable to properly satisfy her preferences. The 
aim of the social planner is then to help the individual to correct her eventual decision 
flaws, and therefore to become rational and to satisfy her “true” preferences. There exists 
here a duality between the actual preferences of the individual – the relation that 
determines her effective choice – and her true preferences, i.e. the relation that would 
have determined her choice if she was perfectly rational. Sunstein and Thaler therefore 
defend the idea that, since the individuals can make mistakes (in the sense that they do 
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not satisfy their true preferences), they should be nudged by the individual in charge of 
the design of the situation of choice – the “choice architect” – so that they satisfy in fine 
their true preferences. 
Libertarian paternalism has been presented as “the real Third Way” (Thaler and Sunstein 
2008, 252-253), and many behavioural economists showed a great interest in soft 
paternalism as a solution to the reconciliation problem (see for instance Kahneman (2011, 
412-415) who describes Nudge as a “bible for behavioral economics”). In order to 
constitute a real alternative to paternalism and libertarianism, we suggest that two 
conditions need to be fulfilled: 
 
(i) Subjectivity condition: it is possible to impartially define the true and subjective 
preferences of the individuals, and to implement a choice architecture such 
that they satisfy those true preferences. 
(ii)  Free-choice condition: when nudged by a choice architect, the individuals are 
still able to make free choices. 
 
Under those conditions, libertarian paternalism can indeed be considered as a real 
alternative to paternalism, since the planner respects the subjectivity of the individuals 
(and does not try to implement what she thinks is the “right” choice from her own point 
of view) and does not coerce them. In this paper, we suggest discussing those two 
conditions. We firstly show that the subjectivity condition can be verified if and only if 
we accept the empirical validity of the neoclassical model of individual behaviour. This 
conclusion is obviously in contradiction with the central objective of behavioural 
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economists which is to build theories of individual behaviour grounded on psychology 
rather than on a priori principles of rational choice. We then show that, if we accept 
Suntein and Thaler’s conception of the individual, the free-choice condition can be 
verified if and only if the individuals are not sensible to nudges, i.e. if and only if 
libertarian paternalism cannot be efficient. We indeed argue that the freedom of choice 
should be evaluated through the set of options within which an individual is actually able 
to make her choice, and not the set within which a rational individual would be able to 
make her choice. We then suggest a possible reformulation of libertarian paternalism 
consistent with its initial spirit and respectful of the subjectivity and the free-choice 
conditions. 
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we show that the reasoning of Sunstein 
and Thaler presents strong similarities with the methodological approach of Pareto and 
his theory of the homo œconomicus. Thanks to this parallel, we show in section 3 the 
difficulties of isolating the true preferences of the individual, and therefore of respecting 
the subjectivity condition. In section 4, we suggest that the mere efficiency of libertarian 
paternalism implies that the free-choice condition cannot be verified within Sunstein and 
Thaler’s framework. We then present our reformulation of libertarian paternalism, 
grounded on a normative criterion of individual autonomy rather than preference-
satisfaction. In section 5, we justify our normative criterion in the context of the 
management of common-pool resources, by showing that the institutional design 
principles of Ostrom (1990) that characterize robust institutions for managing common-
pool resources perfectly correspond to the policy that a government guided by a criterion 
of individual autonomy would try to implement. 
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2. Libertarian paternalism and logical actions 
 
The fundamental argument that justifies libertarian paternalism is the idea that 
paternalism is unavoidable. People are subject to numerous decision biases, such as 
optimism and overconfidence (Sunstein 1998), loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky 
1979) and status quo biases (Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988). They are therefore 
“Humans” – homo sapiens – and not merely “Econs” – homo œconomicus (Thaler and 
Sunstein, 2008, 6). Since people are sensible to framing effects, the choice architect can 
slightly influence their choices. Sunstein and Thaler illustrate this phenomenon with the 
management of a cafeteria. They imagine the work of Carolyn, in charge of the location 
of the different food items (2003, 175). Carolyn knows how the organisation of her 
cafeteria can change the choices of the individuals. Since the choice architecture is not 
neutral, the choice architect can influence the choices of the decision makers in order to 
satisfy a specific objective: paternalism is therefore unavoidable. It becomes then 
imperative to determine what objective the choice architect should pursue. Sunstein and 
Thaler argue that the most legitimate objective is to help people to improve their well-
being, as judged by themselves (2008, 5). The logic of libertarian paternalism is therefore 
that people aim to choose the options that will make them better off, but that – due to 
human fallibility – they often make non rational choices, in the sense that they miss their 
objective. Since a choice architect has the possibility of slightly influencing people's 
choices, she should nudge them so that they achieve in fine this objective. Since this 
approach is not coercive (the individuals are indeed not forced to choose the option the 
choice architect wants them to choose), Sunstein and Thaler argue that the freedom of 
choice of the decision makers is preserved. Furthermore, it seems very appealing to 
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nudge people towards what they would have chosen if they “had complete information, 
unlimited cognitive abilities, and no lack of self-control”, since people would probably 
agree with this objective if they were aware that they are nudged by the choice architect. 
However, despite their references to behavioural considerations and their reject of the 
model of the homo œconomicus as a descriptive model of human behaviour, Sunstein and 
Thaler’s reasoning is paradoxically grounded on this same model. Their reasoning is 
indeed the following: people have subjective preferences but, since they are Humans and 
not Econs, they can miss to satisfy them; as a planner (a choice architect), we should 
therefore help them to satisfy their subjective preferences; to do so, we must then identify 
what their “true” preferences are, such that we will be able to implement the adequate 
choice architecture. Those true preferences – by opposition to the effective preferences of 
the individual that determine her effective choice – correspond to the relation that would 
have determined her choice if she was perfectly rational, i.e. if she was an Econ and not a 
Human: isolating a rational component (the true preferences) within the effective 
preferences precisely corresponds to the methodological approach suggested by Pareto 
and his notion of the homo œconomicus. 
 
Pareto (1909, 1916) grounded his sociology on a classification of human actions 
according to two criteria, whether the action is undertaken (subjectively) in order to 
satisfy a given purpose or not, and whether this action is objectively appropriate towards 
the subjective purpose of the individual. Pareto then defined logical actions as the set of 
actions for which the individual has an intention of satisfying a purpose, when this action 
is objectively appropriate towards this purpose. When the objective purpose (i.e. what the 
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individual will really achieve) differs from the subjective purpose (what the individual 
tries to achieve), the actions are non-logical, and can be classified into different 
categories, according to the nature of the difference between the objective and the 
subjective purpose ([1916] 1936, §151). Therefore logical actions “logically conjoin 
means to ends not only from the standpoint of the subject performing them, but from the 
standpoint of other persons who have a more extensive knowledge” ([1916] 1936, §150). 
Pareto then suggested a methodological reductionism and claim that the individual can be 
studied as the aggregation of different kind of homines, according to the nature of the 
action ([1909] 1971, Chap.1). In particular, he defined a homo œconomicus as the 
“dimension” of human being which deals with logical actions: the homo œconomicus 
therefore models the behaviour of an individual who knows what her objectives are and 
how to satisfy them. 
We can underline several similarities between Pareto’s approach and the model of human 
behaviour that supports libertarian paternalism. Sunstein and Thaler assume that 
individuals want to improve their well-being, as judged by themselves: we find here the 
first criterion of a logical action, the intention of satisfying a subjective purpose. They 
then suggest that individuals often make bad choices (either due to information issues or 
to a lack of self-control), and that the choice architect can help them to achieve their 
purpose. To reuse the definition of Pareto, we can say that individuals often make actions 
which logically conjoin means to ends from their own standpoint, but not from the 
standpoint of the choice architect, a person who is supposed to have a more extensive 
knowledge. Libertarian paternalism is therefore grounded on the will of creating a choice 
architecture such that the individuals perform in fine logical actions. However, unlike 
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Pareto who only considered the homo œconomicus as a descriptive model of human 
behaviour (empirically valid in a few settings such as repeated markets (Plott 1996)) and 
a useful abstraction for the study of markets (Pareto [1909] 1971, Ch.3, §65-66 and §87)), 
Sunstein and Thaler describes this rational entity as a normative model of human 
behaviour, i.e. what the individuals would like to be while making choices. They 
implicitly assume that being rational improves individual well-being, and therefore that it 
constitutes a valid normative model of behaviour. Indeed, assuming that an individual 
would accept to be nudged if it enables her to improve her well-being implies that, in a 
state of perfect rationality, her preferences are “better” than her effective preferences. 
There however exist several games for which this condition is not true, i.e. games for 
which rationality is self-defeating. In those games, satisfying preferences different from 
one’s true preferences can improve the well-being of the decision-maker1: this implies 
that people would not necessarily agree to become rational, and therefore that – on a 
purely technical level – the homo œconomicus is not necessarily an acceptable normative 
model of behaviour. 
Furthermore, it seems a bit ironic that the proponents of libertarian paternalism – who are 
also behavioural economists – criticized the model of a rational homo œconomicus as a 
description of actual human behaviour, but want to define this same homo œconomicus as 
the ideal the individuals want to be. Indeed, a normative model of human behaviour 
should present some empirical relevance, since the choice architect must predict the 
behaviour of the individual if she was a homo œconomicus, which presupposes that this 
situation is possible (or at least credible). This model of behaviour is however quite 
                                                          
1
 It is for instance the case of coordination games (such as the Hi-Lo game, in which rational players are 
unable to coordinate themselves), or of commitment games, such as the Toxin Puzzle (Kavka 1983). 
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implausible: it necessitates the existence of “true” preferences, a priori and immutable. 
The decision making process is then conceptualized as follows: an individual has a clear 
set of ends (subjective and given a priori), a set of means at her disposal, and she chooses 
the means that best satisfy her ends. The individual is then nothing more than a computer, 
“fitting given means to given ends” (Georgescu-Roegen 1971, 343). It can here seem a 
bit surprising that, as behavioural economists, the proponents of libertarian paternalism 
accept such a model based on principles of rational choice and free from any psychology. 
However, despite those criticisms, it is still possible to assume that being rational 
constitutes an acceptable normative model of behaviour, and that each individual actually 
presents “true” preferences. Although the representation of the individual as a rational 
homo œconomicus trapped in a non rational body who tries to satisfy some true 
preferences is questionable, it is still possible to accept libertarian paternalism as a Real 
Third Way if it is possible to isolate those true preferences and to implement the ad hoc 
choice architecture, i.e. if the subjectivity condition can be verified. 
3. Isolating the true preferences 
 
Suppose now that the homo œconomicus constitutes an acceptable normative model of 
human behaviour, and that each individual has true preferences. The planner needs now 
to identify those true preferences, so that she will be able to design the adequate choice 
architecture. A first solution would be to deduce them from the effective preferences of 
the individual. This approach is for instance endorsed by Bleichrodt et al. (2001), who 
assume that the individuals present loss aversion, and try then to deduce the true and 
unbiased preferences of the individuals from their revealed preferences. However, we 
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cannot know a priori the list of the different biases that influence individuals’ decisions. 
In the case of Bleichrodt et al., it can be doubtful to assume that the individuals only 
present loss aversion, since it is not necessarily their only bias, and it is not certain that 
they really suffer from loss aversion. Knowing the actual preferences is therefore 
probably insufficient to obtain the true preferences, since there is an issue of 
identification within the determinants of behaviour between the true preferences and the 
possible decision flaws that affect the choices of the individual. It becomes therefore 
necessary to implement an impartial mechanism able to reveal the true and unbiased 
preferences of the individuals. 
Several authors – including Pareto (1909, Chap.3, §1) – suggest that the discovery of the 
true preferences is the product of learning thanks to the repetition of the situation of 
choice. Binmore stresses for instance that people tends to behave according to the rational 
choice theory (and therefore to act like the homo œconomicus) if the problem “seems 
simple to the subjects”, the “incentives provided are ‘adequate’”, and the “time allowed 
for trial-and-error adjustment is ‘sufficient’” (Binmore 1999, F17). A choice architect can 
therefore perform repeated experiments involving the individuals in order to deduce their 
true preferences. However, since the true preferences of the individual are defined 
subjectively, it is not possible to know at which time the individual is satisfying them: 
there is indeed still an issue of identification, since it is maybe not possible to distinguish 
between the true preferences and a systematic decision flaw. There is therefore here the 
temptation of defining objectively the ends of the individual (for instance as selfish ones), 
and to consider that the individual has achieved this state of rationality and performs 
logical actions if and only if she is satisfying the preferences expected by the 
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experimenter. This is for instance what Binmore is doing in his analysis of the ultimatum 
game: 
“Novices offer a fair amount because this is what their currently operative social norm 
recommends. Novices who are offered unfairly small amounts are programmed to feel 
resentful and so want to punish the proposer by refusing. But this behaviour changes 
over time as people dimly perceive that the norm they are using is not adapted to the 
problem with which they are faced. In the Ultimatum Game, people learn that it does 
not make much sense to get angry if offered too little, but the mavericks who initially 
make small offers learn much faster that it does not make sense to demand too much if 
one is nearly always refused.” (Binmore 1999, F22) 
 
Binmore considers that the individuals tend to a payoff maximizing behaviour (since 
“people learn that it does not make much sense to get angry if offered too little”), but we 
cannot directly observe it since “the mavericks who initially make small offers learn 
much faster that it does not make sense to demand too much if one is nearly always 
refused”. There is therefore here the implicit assumption that the individuals respect a 
social norm because they want to maximize their payoff, although we cannot know what 
the motives of the individuals are: we can for instance consider that an individual respects 
a specific norm by conformism (see for instance the famous experiment of Asch 1955), 
or – as suggested by Binmore himself (F19) – that the subjects want to achieve what they 
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perceive as the experimenter’s objective2, since this one can be perceived as an 
authoritative figure (Milgram 1975). 
 
Since we cannot make a clear distinction between the ends of the individual and the 
different factors that can influence her decision, it seems quite difficult to design an 
experiment for which “the time allowed for trial-and-error adjustment is ‘sufficient’”. An 
apparent stable behaviour can indeed correspond to the pursuit of a specific end plus a 
systematic decision flaw. In the previous example, we can for instance assume that the 
true objective of an individual is to offer and accept only equal shares, but she prefers to 
follow an unfair rule that was implemented during the experiment by conformism. 
Although the actual behaviour of the individual is well predicted by the theory according 
to which the individuals want to maximize their payoff, the underlying reasons of her 
choice are not the simple maximization of her payoff. 
This raises considerable practical issues for libertarian paternalism. Since the choice 
architect tries to implement a choice architecture that will lead the individuals to perform 
logical actions, it is essential to clearly define what would be the choice of the individuals 
if they were able to perform logical actions. The crucial issue is that logical actions are 
defined by conditions such that “sufficient” repetitions and “adequate” incentives: the 
qualification of “logical” for a specific action is therefore subject to the personal 
interpretation of the experimenter. It seems therefore implausible to implement an 
impartial procedure which could isolate the true preferences from the actual preferences 
                                                          
2
 In the case of experimental economics, we can typically observe that many participants are students in 
economics, who can therefore be aware of the phenomenon the experimenter wants to study. 
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of the individual. The existence of a stable behaviour can indeed correspond to the 
persistence of a decision flaw, and not necessarily to the discovery of the only true 
preferences. It means in particular that the choice architect will be forced to guess what 
the preferences of the individuals are, and is therefore not certain to respect their true 
preferences. 
 
Suppose nevertheless that the choice architect is able to implement an impartial 
mechanism that enables her to determine the true preferences of the individuals. The next 
difficulty of libertarian paternalism is the mere identity of the choice architect: it is 
indeed assumed that there exists a benevolent and omnipotent planner, who has the will 
and the ability to implement the choice architecture that will satisfy the true preferences 
of the individuals. Indeed, as illustrated by Sunstein and Thaler with the example of the 
cafeteria, the choice architect Carolyn is a Human and not an Econ (more generally, they 
stress that many real people are choice architects, such as a doctor who must describe 
different possible treatments available to a patient or a parent describing the possible 
educational options to her son or daughter (2008, 3)). She also makes choices – since she 
has in charge the implementation of a choice architecture – and can make mistakes while 
pursuing her benevolent objective. Furthermore, as a Human, she is not necessarily 
philanthropic and incorruptible, and can use her position of choice architect to obtain a 
personal advantage3. The logic of libertarian paternalism relies on the existence of an 
Econ, able to nudge the individuals, but who does not need to be nudged. 
                                                          
3 Sunstein and Thaler list different possible objectives for the manager of a cafeteria, and consider in 
particular the objective of “[maximizing] the sales of the items from the suppliers that are willing 
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Under the conditions that each individual presents a priori preferences, it seems delicate 
for a choice architect to distinguish between a systematic bias and the true preferences of 
the individual. This difficulty is related to Pareto’s notion of logical action, and in 
particular the difficulty of objectively defining the conditions under which the individuals 
can perform logical actions. In this case, the planner is forced to decide what the true 
preferences of the individuals are. Furthermore, once the planner knows her objective, it 
is assumed that she does not need to be nudged nor monitored by another planner: this 
conception of the benevolent and rational planner is hardly acceptable, since libertarian 
paternalism is grounded on the idea that individuals – and therefore choice architects too 
– need to be nudged. The subjectivity condition cannot probably be verified: identifying 
the self-assessed well-being of the individuals necessitates indeed the existence of a true 
and rational self within each individual – the homo œconomicus – whose preferences can 
be discovered by a benevolent planner, who must be an Econ and not a Human. Since 
there exists an issue of identification between the true preferences and systematic biases, 
the objective the planner wants to implement is possibly not the objective the individual 
would have pursue if she was rational, with perfect information and without lack of self-
control. 
4. Nudges and freedom of choice 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
to offer the larger bribes” (2008, 2). They simply dismiss this option by assuming that “Carolyn is 
honorable and honest” (2008, 3). 
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Although we show in the previous section that isolating the true preferences of the 
individual – and then implementing the adequate choice architecture – is probably not 
possible, we can still assume that the choice architect manages in fine to discover them 
(by implementing an impartial procedure which enables her to isolate the true preferences 
from the actual ones with certainty), or that what she thinks to be the true preferences is 
relatively close to the true preferences of the individual. Under those conditions, it will be 
possible to interpret libertarian paternalism as an alternative to paternalism if the free-
choice condition is verified, i.e. if an individual who is nudged towards her true 
preferences is still able to make free choices. The central issue here is to precisely define 
what the freedom of choice is: this question is indeed tightly intertwined with the issue of 
the definition of the self. We suggest defining the freedom of choice as the ability to 
choose without being coerced by elements external to our self, whether or not the choices 
of the self are determined or predictable. We define an individual able to make free 
choices as an autonomous individual. 
If we consider the model of the individual retained by the proponents of libertarian 
paternalism, then the self is the homo œconomicus, and individual choices can be 
influenced by external factors such as psychological biases and framing effects. We 
suggest now showing that this conception of the individual – necessary to the respect of 
the subjectivity condition and the discovery of the true preferences – implies that the free-
choice condition cannot be verified. Indeed, Sunstein and Thaler evaluate the freedom of 
choice through the set of actions an individual has at her disposal – since they consider 
that nudges, when they are “easy to avoid”, does not restrict the freedom of choice of the 
individuals (2008, 6) – and not through the set of actions within which an individual is 
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actually able to choose her action (i.e. within which she can make free choices). Our 
point is that it not self-evident to argue that an individual whose choices are conditioned 
by frames can make free choices. Indeed, Suntein and Thaler emphasize that nudges are 
not coercive and do not limit the freedom of choice of the individuals, since they can still 
choose another option that the one wanted by the choice architect if they want it. The 
central difficulty of this argument is that real individuals, unlike the homo œconomicus, 
are generally not able to choose what they “really” want: this is precisely the reason why, 
according to Sunstein and Thaler, people should be nudged. Suppose for instance that 
behavioural economists discover a specific frame such that, when the individual is not 
aware that she is subject to framing effects, she will systematically choose a specific 
option (a kind of default option for instance). It implies that the choice of the real 
individual is determined by the only choice architecture: does the existence of alternative 
options increase the freedom of choice of the individual in this situation? Since her 
choice will always be the default option, unless someone told her that she is subject to 
framing effects, the set of options within which she is actually able to select her choice 
does not extend: this situation is therefore equivalent, in terms of freedom of choice, to a 
situation in which the only available action is the one chosen by the choice architect. The 
only difference is that the individual have the illusion of having a greater freedom of 
choice. The central issue is indeed that the choice of the individual is conditioned by the 
frame, which is an element external to her true self, the homo œconomicus. 
We can now notice that a necessary condition for the efficiency of libertarian paternalism 
is that nudges effectively improve individual welfare, and therefore condition the choices 
of the individuals. If the choice architect is able to improve individual welfare thanks to 
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framing effects, then it means that choices are not free: they are indeed conditioned by an 
element external to the self, the will of the choice architect. The mere influence of nudges 
on individual choices implies that the freedom of choice is not preserved, since the 
individuals are to some extent “manipulated” by the choice architect. This means that the 
free-choice condition cannot be verified if a planner wants to improve individual welfare 
by using framing effects, as suggested by the proponents of libertarian paternalism. 
Libertarian paternalism, as conceived by Suntein and Thaler, cannot be libertarian by 
construction, since it relies on the idea that the choice architect can manipulate individual 
choices, which necessitates exploiting the limited freedom of choice of the individuals. 
Indeed, within Sunstein and Thaler’s framework, the free-choice condition can be 
verified if and only if people are homo œconomicus: this would imply that they are not 
sensible to frames, and also that nudging is not necessary. 
 
Libertarian paternalism presents several difficulties: the proponents of this approach 
firstly assume that there exists a true and rational self within each individual – similar to 
the paretian homo œconomicus – and that it constitutes a normative model of human 
behaviour. They then assume that it is possible to impartially isolate her true preferences, 
and therefore that the homo œconomicus provides an empirically relevant description of 
human behaviour in specific settings. It is also assumed that there exists a benevolent 
planner – who is an Econ and not a Human – who has the will and the ability to 
implement a choice architecture such that the individuals will in fine satisfy their true 
preferences. Finally, the freedom of choice is evaluated from the standpoint of individuals 
who are not subject to framing effects – i.e. Econs – and not from the standpoint of the 
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real Humans who make choices. The free-choice condition can therefore be verified if 
and only if the individuals are Econs, for whom nudges are by construction inefficient. In 
its current formulation, libertarian paternalism therefore constitutes a regular form of 
paternalism: the only difference between both approaches is that the planner does not 
directly coerce the individuals, but uses their limited freedom of choice to implement a 
specific option. It is therefore not possible to consider libertarian paternalism, as defined 
by Suntein and Thaler, as the “Real Third Way”. 
 
We now suggest reformulating libertarian paternalism and provide an alternative solution 
to the reconciliation problem. Our claim is that the difficulties of libertarian paternalism 
are due to a wrong diagnosis of the normative issue faced by boundedly rational 
individuals: in a libertarian perspective, the normative issue is not that the individuals do 
not necessarily satisfy their preferences, but that they are not autonomous, and therefore 
that a third party (the choice architect), thanks to framing effects, is able to manipulate 
them and to influence in fine their choices without their consent. Sunstein and Thaler 
justify paternalistic interventions by arguing that the individuals can make bad choices 
(they recognize it a posteriori and even agree in some cases to implement commitment 
devices to help them to achieve their objectives (2008, 44-49)) and are sensible to frames. 
We should therefore use frames to help them to correct their mistakes. The planner should 
then identify what they truly want and implement the adequate choice architecture. It is 
therefore necessary to define what a “bad” choice is and how to recognize it. The 
difficulty here is that we need to define a normative model of behaviour: a bad choice 
means indeed that there exists a difference between what an individual has chosen and 
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what she would have chosen if she was a “better person” (from her own point of view) at 
the moment of her choice. The notions of “mistake” and “bad” choice are indeed strongly 
related to the normative considerations of the individual and to her own perception as an 
agent. Consider for instance an individual who considers herself as the product of 
complex psychological phenomena. Unless her choices were influenced by external 
elements such as alcohol or drugs, she will not consider choices influenced by framing 
effects (resulting for instance from loss aversion) as mistakes or bad choices, since she 
made her choices as an autonomous agent. Libertarian paternalism, as formulated by 
Sunstein and Thaler, cannot be libertarian because it imposes to the individuals a 
normative model of behaviour, the paretian homo œconomicus. 
 
However, although an individual, as an autonomous agent, can accept to be sensible to 
frames, being boundedly rational can constitute a normative issue since our choices can 
be manipulated by an external element to our self, the will of the choice architect. 
Providing a libertarian solution to the reconciliation problem therefore needs to directly 
treat the limited freedom of choice rather than its consequences (since the choice 
architect is unable to properly identify the self of each individual). Two possible 
approaches are then possible: the planner can either teach people how to make choices 
(rather than trying to guess what they would have chosen if they were able to make free 
choices), or ensures that the individual are able to implement their own commitment 
devices and the frames that will condition their choices. In the first case, the objective is 
to try to free the individuals from framing effects: a possible advice the planner could 
give to the individuals would be for instance to always evaluate the available options 
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under different frames. In the second case, we start from the observation that people (as 
psychological agents) are necessarily conditioned by frames, but that they should be able 
to design the frames of their future choices (rather than letting this task to a choice 
architect who will not necessarily try to get their consent): their freedom of choice is 
therefore preserved, since their choices are conditioned by a frame they have themselves 
designed as autonomous agents. Consider for instance the case of a doctor who must 
describe different possible treatments to a patient: rather than choosing the choice 
architecture that – according to her – will improve the well-being of the patient, she could 
for instance present a single information with different frames (for instance present the 
probability of success of each treatment and then the probability of failure, while 
emphasizing that the final choice can be influenced by the way with which the 
information was provided). Consider now the cafeteria of Sunstein and Thaler. Rather 
than directly choosing the location of the different items, Carolyn could inform the users 
how their choices can be affected, and then give them the opportunity to choose the 
location (by a public discussion and a vote for instance). If the users show little interest in 
this question and do not want to get involved in the choice of the location, they can 
delegate their choice to Carolyn and let her in charge of the location. The main difference 
between Sunstein and Thaler’s example and this last situation is that, although Carolyn 
manipulates in fine the choice of the individual in both cases, she has their consent only 
in the second case, i.e. when the individuals, as autonomous agents, had the ability to 
choose the location but preferred to let a third party in charge of it. 
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The normative criterion we suggest is therefore not the maximization of one’s self-
assessed well-being any more, but the development of individual autonomy, understood 
as the ability to make free choices. The freedom of choice is evaluated as the autonomy 
towards external elements of the self, such as probably framing effects (either by 
learning, or by the possibility of choosing the frames of one’s own choices): within 
Sunstein and Thaler’s conception of the individual, the remaining criterion that 
determines the choices would therefore be the subjective evaluation of the different 
alternatives. This implies that individual autonomy is a sufficient condition to the 
maximisation of one’s self-assessed well-being: instead of helping the individuals to 
maximize their welfare by nudging them towards what we think they would prefer if they 
were autonomous, we suggest helping the individuals to become autonomous, and then 
let them make their own choices. This new formulation of libertarian paternalism in terms 
of individual autonomy rather than preference-satisfaction implies that (i) the planner 
does not try to influence the choices of the individuals and therefore respects their 
subjectivity, and (ii) the individuals learn how to free themselves from the possible 
effects that could limit their freedom of choice. A major improvement of this 
reformulation is also that, unlike the proponents of the preference-satisfaction approach, 
we do not need to objectively define what the true self of the individuals is any more, and 
let them behave according to their own normative model of behaviour. It is therefore 
possible to define this approach as “soft” paternalism: the planner does not have an 
invasive role, and her action prevents the individuals from the “mistakes” that would 
have justified a paternalistic intervention. 
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5. Illustration: the management of a common-pool resource 
 
We now suggest illustrating the relevance of a public policy guided by a principle of 
individual autonomy rather than preference-satisfaction by considering, on a more 
empirical level, the design principles that characterize robust institutions for managing 
common-pool resources (Ostrom 1990). We want to highlight that some of these 
principles are logical recommendations from the point of view of a government guided 
by a normative principle of individual autonomy. 
Common-pool resources (CPR) are a class of goods characterized by two attributes, the 
difficulty of excluding individuals from benefiting from the resource, and the 
subtractability of the benefits consumed by an individual from those available to others. 
Two main types of problems can emerge in this context, appropriation and provision 
problems: appropriation problems are related to the exclusion of potential beneficiaries 
and the repartition of the output, whereas provision problems are related to the 
management of the stock of the resource, whether it be its creation, the maintenance or 
improvement of its production capabilities, or the avoidance of its destruction (Ostrom et 
al, 1994, 9). Ostrom (1990) suggested a list of eight design principles that characterize 
the institutions enabling a sustainable management of CPR, which have been slightly 
amended by Cox et al. (2010), who provide a meta-analysis of the different empirical 
works that tested those principles (extract from Cox et al. 2010, Table 4): 
- 1A, user boundaries: clear boundaries between legitimate users and non users 
must be clearly defined; 
- 1B, resource boundaries: clear boundaries are present that define a resource 
system and separate it from the larger biophysical environment; 
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- 2A, congruence with local conditions: appropriation and provision rules are 
congruent with local social and environmental conditions; 
- 2B, appropriation and provision: the benefits obtained by users from a CPR, as 
determined by appropriation rules, are proportional to the amount of inputs 
required in the form of labour, material, or money, as determined by the provision 
rules; 
- 3, collective-choice arrangements: most individuals affected by the operational 
rules can participate in modifying the operational rules; 
- 4A, monitoring users: monitors who are accountable to the users monitor the 
appropriation and provision levels of the users; 
- 4B, monitoring the resource: monitors who are accountable to the users monitor 
the conditions of the resource; 
- 5, graduated sanctions: appropriators who violate operational rules are likely to be 
assessed graduated sanctions (depending on the seriousness and the context of the 
offense) by other appropriators, by officials accountable to the appropriators, or 
by both; 
- 6, conflict-resolution mechanisms: appropriators and their officials have rapid 
access to low-cost local arenas to resolve conflicts among appropriators or 
between appropriators and officials; 
- 7, minimal recognition of rights to organize: the rights of appropriators to devise 
their own institutions are not challenged by external governmental authorities; 
- 8, nested enterprises: appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict 
resolution, and governance activities are organized in multiple layers of nested 
enterprises 
 
Our purpose is not to extensively discuss these different principles, but to highlight that 
most of them are directly supported by our normative criterion of individual autonomy. 
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We can indeed notice that the main feature of those principles is the idea that the users of 
the CPR should be able to design their own institutional environment (this is quite 
explicit in the principles 3 and 7). Furthermore, the eventual external actors who monitor 
the users and the resource, or who assess possible sanctions in case of non respect of the 
appropriation and provision rules are systematically accountable to the users. Several 
empirical studies showed for instance that when the rules are imposed by an external 
authority, this one generally fails to enforce them, leading to suboptimal results (Ostrom 
et al. 1994, 221-222). Nevertheless, although direct interventions often fail, the 
government can help the users to manage more efficiently the resource: Blomquist (1994) 
– from empirical evidence of groundwater systems in Southern California – suggests for 
instance that the design of provision and appropriation rules is facilitated by the presence 
of government agencies that can provide reliable information to the users (296-297). 
From various laboratory experiments and field studies, Ostrom et al. (1994) argue that 
the individuals can overcome the temptation of overusing the resource if they have some 
expectation of mutual trust, or the possibility of building trust through continued 
interaction and communication (328), and if they have some autonomy to decide on their 
own rules (323). However, since it appears that boundedly rational individuals can have 
some difficulties to reach optimal rules – mainly due to information issues and the 
complexity of the problem – governmental agencies play an important role by 
recognizing the right to the individuals to form their own rules and commitments, but 
also by providing them reliable information and backup enforcement mechanisms (322-
327). 
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We can now notice that those conditions, and in particular the role of the government as 
an actor who provides information and support to the individuals without directly 
intervening nor trying to influence individuals’ choices, correspond to the kind of 
normative prescriptions that would emerge from libertarian paternalism, when understood 
in terms of individual autonomy rather than preference-satisfaction. Our claim is indeed 
that the planner should assess public policies in terms of individual autonomy, i.e. the 
ability of the individuals to make free choices: this necessitates providing the largest 
information to the individuals, and let them decide on their own rules rather than 
imposing external rules. 
In addition, the case of CPR gives us another argument in favour of a more deontological 
formulation of libertarian paternalism, the impact of institutional rules on individual 
preferences. It seems indeed that individual preferences in CPR situations depend on the 
institutional organisation that rules the appropriation and the provision of the resource: 
self-organized institutions are more likely to generate prosocial behaviours than rules 
imposed by an external authority. It means that – in addition of questioning the 
assumption of the existence of “true” preferences, independent from the institutional 
context – imposing the same policy can have a different impact according to its initiator: 
empirical evidence in CPR situations suggest that policies implemented by autonomous 
individuals are more likely to be efficient than policies implemented by an external 
choice architect. It is therefore probably not equivalent to try to implement what the 
individuals would have chosen if they were autonomous (such as in Sunstein and Thaler’s 
definition of libertarian paternalism) and to try to directly improve the autonomy of the 
individuals. A nudge implemented by the individuals who will be affected by this nudge 
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is maybe more likely to be efficient than the same nudge implemented by an external 
choice architect: in the latter case, the individuals can indeed be suspicious about the 
objective of the choice architect, and then choose an option different from the one wanted 
by the choice architect. 
The management of common-pool resources offers us a good illustration of one of the 
main objectives of our reformulation of libertarian paternalism. While the proponents of 
libertarian paternalism – as well as neoclassical economists – ground their normative 
assessments on consequentialist considerations such as the welfare generated by the 
satisfaction of one’s preferences, we suggest adopting a more procedural approach by 
grounding our normative assessments on individual autonomy and the ability to design 
one’s own frames. It seems indeed that the sustainable management of a CPR (and 
therefore the welfare it generates) is not only the result of the implementation of specific 
rules, but also of the conditions under which these rules were decided: promoting 
individual welfare therefore necessitates promoting individual autonomy, since the rules 
that will enable the individuals to maximize their welfare are more likely to be efficient if 
they are implemented by autonomous agents rather than by an external authority. If the 
objective of the government is the maximisation of individual self-assessed well-being, 
then a necessary preliminary step seems to be the development of individual autonomy. 
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